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The paper explores the long-term developmental legacies of Protestant missionary involvement in colonial India, 
specifically missionary effects on male-female inequalities in educational attainment. Our causal mechanisms draw 
on studies in the sociology and economics of religion that highlight the importance of the dynamics of religious 
competition for the provision of public goods. We argue that missionaries played a key role in the development of 
mass female schooling because of the competition among rival religious and secular groups that they spurred in 
education provision. We explore these causal mechanisms in a case study of the state of Kerala, and statistical 
analysis covering most of India’s districts. For the statistical analysis, we assembled original district-level datasets 
covering colonial and post-colonial periods. Our data allow us to establish whether missionary effects hold after we 
account for other factors hypothesized to have a bearing on human development like British colonial rule, 
modernization, European presence, education expenditures, post-colonial democracy, Islam, caste and tribal status, 
and land tenure. Our analysis reveals that colonial-era Christian missionary activity is consistently associated with 
better female education outcomes in both the colonial and post-colonial periods.
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Introduction 
There are established lines of theorizing linking religion to socio-economic and political regime outcomes. 
Depending on the specific doctrinal or contextual factors, religion and the institutions and actors associated with it 
have been either vilified as reactionary, or, conversely, perceived as progressive forces shaping political culture, 
human capital, and development.1 The controversy is particularly true for an important set of religious 
entrepreneurs, Christian missionaries, operating in colonial contexts. Branded as “workhorses of empire,” 
“precursors of the flag,”2 and “helpmates of … imperialists”3 or, alternatively, as benign and principled crusaders 
for social justice4, their links with colonial authority have been often taken for granted, and any independent effects 
they might have had on development have been under-explored and under-theorized. Only recently have social 
scientists begun to analyze systematically aspects of missionary activity, which might have long-term independent 
political and developmental effects.  For instance, Trejo found that Christian missions provided an impulse to social 
mobilization among indigenous groups in Latin America. Bolt and Bezemer have argued that missionary education 
in vernacular languages in Africa have had long-term economic growth effects. Woodberry gathered cross-national 
data on missions and found strong missionary effects on post-colonial democracy. And Posner found that 
missionaries in Africa shaped post-colonial nations’ linguistic landscapes because they selectively codified 
vernacular languages.5 
 An important area of missionary work, female education, has however remained outside of the purview of 
much of the recent social science scholarship dealing with missionary effects or more generally with the legacies of 
colonialism. While colonial historiography is replete with references to missionaries as important to the 
development of female education,6 hardly any rigorous studies of the long term effects of this aspect of missionary 
work have been conducted. This omission is puzzling given the overwhelming empirical evidence of the impact of 
women’s education on development, on policy, and the quality of governance.7  
 How do we begin to study missionary effects on female education given the complexity and diversity of 
religious and colonial contexts in which they operated? By the end of the nineteenth century, missionary work 
represented a transnational multi-denominational enterprise: American Salvationists were just as likely to be active 
in a British colony as were Anglicans in French West Africa.8 Western missions also often operated in contexts with 
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established indigenized Christian Churches. Finally, they had to reckon with western colonial powers, as indeed 
with native secular authorities and ideological movements. These various religious and secular actors espoused 
diverging positions with regard to social modernization and female education in particular. 
This paper draws on classic theorizing on religion, which highlights the importance of religious 
competition in the provision of public goods.9 The competition mechanism is useful for understanding how one set 
of religious entrepreneurs could trigger female education provision by a wider group of religious and secular 
authorities. In opting for religious competition theory as our analytical vantage point, we do not dismiss the 
importance of doctrinal matters in shaping missionary educational preferences. Our framework is rooted in the long-
standing scholarship on the role of Protestant Christianity in the spread of mass education.10 It differs however from 
established strands of social science theorizing on religion that mostly focus on the importance of doctrinal nuances 
or Church-state relationships for developmental outcomes.11 
We illustrate how missionary-triggered religious competition might have long-term effects on female 
education, and in particular on gender education inequalities, based on a sub-national study of colonial and post-
colonial India. Colonial India resembled a patchwork quilt comprised of directly ruled British territories and 
indirectly ruled princely states. Missionary involvement had been spatially uneven: while some, particularly coastal 
areas had experienced missionary activity predating, and overlapping with, British colonial rule in others it had been 
sporadic or non-existent. Colonial-era censuses point to substantial spatial variations in female education. These 
variations have persisted into the present: while states like Kerala boast universal literacy, in many others, a large 
percentage of women remain illiterate and there has been limited progress in reducing male-female inequalities in 
access to education. We hypothesize that spatial patterns of institutionalization of co-educational and female 
schooling in the colonial period could explain this variation. These outcomes are in turn attributable to Protestant 
missionary activity in the nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, which spurred competition among religious and 
secular authorities in the status elevation of hitherto disadvantaged groups. 
We make this case by conducting a process-tracing case study of Kerala, India’s most progressive state 
when it comes to female education, and district-level statistical analysis to establish whether missionary-female 
education links hold throughout India. Kerala illustrates how prior to the arrival of Protestant Christian missions 
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native governments and established religious groups showed limited interest in female education outside of a narrow 
elite. By the end of the nineteenth century, following activity by Protestant missions, they became strong advocates 
of mass, including female, education, and key education providers. 
For our statistical analysis, we assembled original district-level datasets. Our exploration of variation in 
missionary involvement in India’s provinces reveals that Christian missionary activity is consistently associated with 
better female education outcomes as measured by differences in education among men and women, in the colonial 
period; it also continues to affect post-colonial variation in female education. These effects hold when we include 
the usual controls of direct British rule, modernization, European settlement, education expenditures, post-colonial 
democracy, as well as those specifically employed in studies of India such as Islam, caste and tribal status, and land 
tenure. Interestingly, we also find that direct British rule is not consistently associated with better female education 
outcomes; furthermore, it has had a deleterious effect on post-colonial gender education equality at some levels of 
schooling. These findings allow us to interrogate both the established assumptions about the human capital effects of 
British colonialism,12 and those postulating links between colonial authorities and missionary activity.13 
In the following section, we contextualize our approach in the broader literature on colonial legacies and 
discuss the religious competition theory and its utility for our analysis. Next, we illustrate the workings of 
competition by setting out the historical context in which Protestant missionaries operated in colonial India and 
conducting a process-tracing study of their involvement in Kerala. We then discuss our data and estimation approach 
and present results of district-level India-wide statistical analysis. A discussion summarizing our findings and their 
implications for debates on developmental effects of colonial-era legacies follows. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Insofar as our focus is on colonial-era religious entrepreneurs and their effects on the gender aspects of human 
capital, our study differs from established and recent burgeoning politics and economics scholarship on the long 
term developmental effects of western engagement in former colonies. This literature has highlighted the importance 
for long term development of colonial political institutions14; the colonial powers’ legal systems15; patterns of 
European settlement16; the political economy of colonialism, notably land tenure17; geographical factors affecting 
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colonial policy18; and western policies specifically targeting native schooling.19 With few exceptions,20 religion has 
been only superficially addressed in these analyses, while the gender aspects of western engagement, whether 
missionary-led, or driven by the above alternative factors, have received even more scant attention. Our study 
therefore differs from existing scholarship in terms of both our key explanatory variables, namely missionary 
effects, and our outcome variables, namely female education.   
Our proposed causal mechanisms linking missionary involvement to female education draw on studies in 
the sociology and economics of religion highlighting the role of interdenominational competition in the provision of 
public goods.21 This scholarship is distinct from predominant approaches to religion and its societal, economic, and 
political effects, which focus on denominational nuances or the institutional structures governing Church-state 
relationships characteristic of particular faiths.22  
In a classic study of religion, Peter Berger highlights the importance of studying the constellations of 
various religious actors in a given setting. He distinguishes among “religious monopolies” and a religious 
“pluralistic situation.” Religious monopolies, which Berger refers to as “regulatory agencies for both thought and 
action,”23 exist when particular faith systems enjoy dominant status in society. Hinduism in predominantly Hindu 
areas prior to Western missionary involvement in colonial India, pre-Revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy sanctioned 
and protected by the state, and Calvinism in Calvin’s Geneva are examples of monopolistic systems. In such 
settings, dominant religions become notorious for religious “totalism” and a tendency for unchecked societal and/ or 
political control. A shift towards a plurality of competing actors involving both the established and non-dominant 
religions helps mitigate the “totalising” aspect of a dominant religion.24 
Berger characterizes a “pluralistic situation” as one in which “… religious ex-monopolies can no longer 
take for granted the allegiance of their client populations.” 25 As a result, a religious tradition, previously 
“authoritatively imposed” now has to be “marketed” to a discerning audience.26 A “pluralistic situation” is therefore 
akin to a marketplace, in which various actors compete for the loyalty of the consumer. The existence of a religious 
marketplace affects both the strategies of dominant religious actors and those of the non-dominant competing 
religious entrepreneurs. The emergence of competing actors on the religious arena undermines the monopoly of 
existing religious institutions. Simultaneously, it forces the dominant and contending non-dominant actors to 
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compete in the delivery of consumer “goods,” spiritual and profane. Where the dominant religion helped maintain 
the status quo either through association with the Caesar, or by way of sanctifying the existing social order, it is now 
forced to reckon with its failing authority by incorporating aspects of competing doctrine and practice. Competition 
stimulates ecumenical processes and convergence in the provision of consumer goods. The competition dynamic is 
not limited to religious actors however, as they often confront competitive pressures in the redefinition of the world 
and the status of individual within it from non-religious rivals. These secular competitors could be political 
authorities or groups espousing rival ideologies like nationalism or communism.27 
Berger’s framework focuses more on the competition mechanism itself than on the doctrinal nuances of 
various religions conducive to the delivery of certain types of public goods. Nevertheless, he follows in the long 
tradition of scholarship linking Protestant Christianity in particular to social modernization. In his framework, 
Protestant groups are initial triggers to social engagement by other entrepreneurs.28 As Berger, Eisenstadt, and 
Walzer have noted, Protestantism’s disposition to “modernity” is rooted in the wars of religion and counter-
reformation, contexts in which Protestant were often an oppressed minority, denied the right to participate in the 
political life of host communities.29 Initially “totalistic” in their orientation much like their Catholic counterparts, 
their oppressed status led them to elaborate a completely new set of approaches to the construction of polity and 
society.30 The historical conditions of the origins and development of these groups, as Berger argues, were 
conducive to the emergence of secularizing impulses within Protestant Christianity.31 In contrast to Catholicism, 
Eastern Christianity, or Islam, characterized by greater ritualism and even withdrawal from active social life, 
Protestantism is more strongly associated with a “this-worldly” orientation whereby ritualistic institutional 
mediation is downplayed or abhorred, and personal responsibility for one’s life and that of the wider community are 
stressed.32 
What are the goods that Protestant religious entrepreneurs might offer to a discerning religious consumer? 
Max Weber highlighted the profane nature of incentives leading individuals to affiliate with specific Churches in 
America, such as the provision of good character certificates in acquiring bank credit.33 Recent studies point to other 
types of goods that might be particularly valued in contemporary developing contexts.34 Trejo found that faced with 
competition from Protestant challengers, the Catholic Church in Mexico’s indigenous regions, a traditional ally of 
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the landed rich and the elites, was more likely to provide such public goods as schooling to the most downtrodden 
groups in society.35 In their study of missionary work in colonial Africa, Gallego and Woodberry likewise suggest 
that new entrants to the religious marketplace might opt for educational work even when existing religions already 
occupy a share of the market. This is because where the dominant political authority favors one religion over others, 
as did the French colonial powers vis-à-vis Catholic missions, the latter have little incentive to provide quality 
schooling, otherwise highly valued in local societies. Protestant competitors in these contexts seize the opportunity 
to cater to potential consumers by improving education, hence the higher quality of Protestant schooling in French 
colonies.36 
While the above few empirical studies provide some insights into the dynamics of religious competition in 
developing states, competition theory has been rightly criticized for being underspecified.37 The theory, developed 
largely with reference to competition in western settings, for instance, is silent on religious entrepreneur strategies 
when applied to female education in non-western cultural contexts. In particular, it is unclear how doctrinal aspects 
of missionary activity may interact with missionaries’ overall competitive objective of capturing a wide market 
where Protestant Christianity is an external cultural import. Our empirical study should help further develop and 
specify the theoretical mechanisms linking competition to strategies of religious groups operating in a colonial 
education marketplace.  
Given the competitive environment of a “pluralistic situation” in which various actors are “optimizers”38 
seeking to cast their net as widely as possible, we would expect competition in the provision of female and not just 
male, education. Historically, doctrinal aspects of Protestantism that stressed personal relationship to God through 
scriptural readings in vernacular languages compelled Protestants to educate both boys and girls of pre-confirmation 
ages. In eighteenth-nineteenth century Europe, Protestant female literacy rates were higher than Catholic; the former 
generally maintained gender parity in primary education; and the Church had a reputation for providing better 
quality girls’ education among all social classes wherever Protestant communities settled.39 
While Protestants developed modern schooling for girls in their own communities, their female education 
practices may differ in proselytizing contexts. Colonial historiography suggests that missionaries may face 
substantially higher barriers of entry into the female, compared to male, education marketplace.40 In European 
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overseas colonies, men tended to value modern education, whether provided by colonial or missionary authorities, 
because of its perceived links to improved job prospects.41 In contexts where cultural practices sanctioned the 
seclusion of women, however, missionaries often faced substantial native resistance to female education.42 Colonial 
authorities also cited cultural sensitivities as grounds for neglecting female education.43 Furthermore, some 
missionaries’ pre-conceived notions about native societies, colored by prevailing colonial prejudices and Victorian-
era “downward filtration” theories encouraged them to court the cultivated elite, male or female, and not the mostly 
uneducated mass populations.44 
Under these circumstances, we would anticipate several potential scenarios and strategies of missionary 
involvement. Under the first scenario, we would expect missionaries to focus on male education provision so as not 
to alienate a large segment of prospective, male, clients. Under the second possible scenario, missionaries would 
advance female education by devising strategies that would make it appealing and acceptable given the peculiarities 
of the wider cultural environments in which they operate. For instance, because of the facility of operating in a 
market that is already comparatively more advanced, and hence, more receptive to education, they could court the 
traditionally better educated elite females by providing education that is innovative and superior to existing 
education opportunities, but one in tune with cultural sensitivities prevailing in elite society. Such a strategy would 
tally with numerous accounts of missionaries preferring to work in the higher-class market; however, it would limit 
their influence to tiny elite, which may be in any case less amenable to conversion because of its high status.45  
Alternatively, they could concentrate on the uneducated and underprivileged mass population, likewise, by tailoring 
their incentives to this particular social stratum. The two strategies of female education need not be exclusive as 
missionaries may seek to cast their net as widely as possible. Whichever female education strategy they choose, their 
efforts are likely to trigger competition among religious monopolies and other groups in the provision of female 
education. 
Under the scenario of missionaries concentrating on male education, we would expect missionary 
involvement in India to have had marginal, non-existent, or deleterious effects on reducing the gaps in education 
between men and women. In the female education scenario, we would expect missionaries to not only directly help 
improve elite or general female education through their own schooling efforts, but also indirectly, because of the 
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education provision competition that they trigger, and because of this competition’s effects on greater social 
acceptability of educational parity for men and women. 
We explore these potential causal mechanisms in the Kerala case study and statistical analysis sections that 
follow. The case study illuminates the dynamics of religious competition in a way that statistical analysis alone 
would not be able to capture given the limited sub-national data on Christian denominational composition and 
growth over time in colonial India. Statistical analysis employing proxies of missionary influences allows us more 
systematically to ascertain whether patterns uncovered in the case study hold throughout India when rival theoretical 
explanations of female education are taken into account. 
 
Uncovering the Mechanisms of Missionary-led Competition in Education Provision in Colonial India 
The context 
Western Christian missionary involvement in India’s education dates back to Portuguese and French presence in 
pockets of coastal territory in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. These early conquests led to the setting up of Jesuit 
schools for boys.46 Active Protestant engagement in India dates back to the early eighteenth century when German 
and Danish Evangelicals established missions in South India and set up schools for men and women of all social 
classes.47  
The eighteenth century is also when the East India Company began expanding its operations in India. Until 
1813, when the Company passed a Charter Act that admitted some responsibility for the education of elite Indians, it 
took limited interest in education and in particular female education. Colonial education policy changed over time 
under pressure from Evangelical missionaries, who were part of the nineteenth century transatlantic ecumenical 
movement of revivalist Protestant Christianity.48 In the mid-nineteenth century, the British introduced a grants-in-
aid system whereby private schools for boys and girls, a large share of which had come to be missionary-run, 
received subsidy.49 
Despite the expansion of schooling over time, colonial education results were unimpressive. According to 
some estimates, in 1916, less than 3 percent of the population in directly ruled territories went through elementary 
schooling.50 Nurullah and Naik estimate that between 1835 and 1931 India-wide literacy rates had dropped by 0.5 
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percent. An alternative estimate is that they increased by only 1.75 percent.51 The mediocre outcomes were 
particularly pronounced for women. While in 1854, there were 2,875 schools for boys in the Bombay Presidency, 
there were only sixty-five girls’ schools and they were all privately run.52 As late as 1920 most of the female 
education provision remained with the voluntary sector.53 Female literacy retention rates were also extremely low 
and male-female gaps in literacy rates tended to widen with age. In 1930, the total “wastage” in girls’ schooling, that 
is, a failure to continue education after the first grade, was 90 percent.54 Utilitarian motives underlie the colonial 
authorities’ hands off approach to female education. Boys’ education resulted in cheap and abundant supplies of 
clerks. Female schooling would have been a more altruistic undertaking due to women’s limited employment 
prospects.55  
There were substantial variations in the provision of female education among India’s provinces however. 
Little evidence exists to suggest that these disparities stemmed from colonial education in directly ruled territories. 
In fact, education results in British provinces notoriously lagged those in some native states. In 1921, in British 
Bihar and Orissa there was one literate female per fifteen literate males, while in princely Cochin and Travancore 
the ratio was one to two.56 
Although no clear patterns could be discerned in education results among British and indirectly ruled 
territories, there was a tendency for Christians of all social classes to have comparatively high female literacy. In 
1931, Christians were above Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and tribal communities in overall literacy with Parsis, 
Jews, and Jains topping the list. They came third in female literacy however after Parsis and Jews. While Muslims 
had fifteen and Hindus had twenty-one literate females per 1,000 people, Christians had 203.57 
Christians however represented a tiny minority in most of colonial India and Catholics or, as in Kerala, 
Syrian, Romo-Syrian, and Latin Catholic Christians, often outnumbered Evangelical groups most active in education 
provision.58 Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, native education provision eclipsed Christian schooling. 
Yet, colonial censuses indicate that where Protestants had been active there were superior female education 
outcomes.59 The Kerala case study that follows illustrates how our religious competition framework could be useful 
for addressing this puzzle.  
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Women’s Education in Kerala: Religious Competition and Secular Responses 
Kerala, which comprises the Malayalam-speaking Malabar, formerly part of the British Madras Presidency, and 
districts formerly in the Travancore and Cochin princely states, has been lauded for its progressive female education 
policies. To what extent are they rooted in colonial-era missionary activity? We contend that colonial Kerala 
represents a classic case of a competitive religious marketplace in which established religious monopolies emulate 
new entrants’ consumer strategies. These competition dynamics in turn have profound effects on gender educational 
outcomes. 
Kerala’s religious diversity notwithstanding, before the arrival of Protestant missions the territories now 
comprising the state had an uncompetitive religious market in which the various religious and secular authorities did 
little to promote mass female education. Christians constitute 19 percent, while Hindus and Muslims, 56 and 25 
percent, respectively, of the state’s population.60 Kerala’s Syrian Church, which links its origins nearly two 
millennia back to the work of Thomas the Apostle, boasted relatively high female education levels due to its elite 
status in society.61 The Church, which practiced existing caste taboos and hierarchies, until the end of the nineteenth 
century did not actively promote mass female literacy.62 Neither the Syrian Catholic Church, comprised of converts 
from Syrian Christianity, nor the Roman Catholic (Latin) Church, dating back to sixteenth century Portuguese 
conquests, showed much interest in the promotion of mass education either until the 1880s.63   
Native governments meantime remained “supremely indifferent” to female education.64 As late as 1863, T. 
Madhava Rao, the Travancore Dewan admitted that government role in female education had been minimal. The 
two government girls’ schools were elite Syrian Christian and Brahmin institutions opened in 1858-59. The Cochin 
and Travancore governments actively obstructed low status boys and girls education. As late as 1889, the Cochin 
government sided with Hindu upper castes in their opposition to the admission of low caste children into a mission 
school in Trichur. Travancore only abolished caste discrimination in schools in 1910, while Cochin conceded to 
eliminating caste discrimination policy nine years later.65 
British Residents, who held advisory positions vis-à-vis native governments in Travancore and Cochin took 
a more active interest in education. They did not obstruct, and at times actively aided missionaries for instance by 
facilitating their travel arrangements or liaisons with native governments.66 The Travancore Resident in 1810-1819, 
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Thomas Munro, was even a known fervent Evangelical.67 Nevertheless, because Residents pursued alliances with 
native royal dynasties and landed elites, they were complicit in “consciously or unconsciously abetting” local 
customs and hierarchies that Protestant missionaries sought to reform.68  
Mass female education in Kerala could be traced back to the establishment in the early nineteenth century 
of the missions of the London Missionary Society (LMS), comprised of Evangelical, Anglican, and Dissenter 
groups, and the Church Missionary Society (CMS), comprised of Church of England Evangelicals. These missions 
opened the first modern girls’, and co-educational, schools in Kerala. In Travancore, the wife of a CMS missionary, 
the Reverend Thomas Norton, set up the first girls’ school in Alleppey in 1820, while the LMS set up a girls’ 
boarding school in 1819 under the patronage of the wife of the Reverend Charles Mead. Another female mission 
worker also opened a formal girls’ school in Kottayam in 1819. By 1846, the LMS Trivandrum mission opened 
three further girls’ schools. A Mrs. Joseph Peet’s school for girls was also opened in Mavelikara in 1838, a Mrs. 
John Chapman school in Kottayam around 1847, and a Mrs. Henry Baker school at Pallom in 1871. In Cochin, the 
wife of the CMS missionary Samuel Ridsdale, the pioneer of female instruction, opened the first girls’ school in 
1826; subsequently, she and her successors set up four further girls’ day and boarding schools. In the 1820s, another 
CMS missionary Thomas Dawson set up four girls’ schools with a total of sixty-four pupils in Cochin. In what was 
an important step in institutionalizing women’s education, in 1848, Protestant missionaries set up Kerala’s first 
female teacher training school. By 1920, CMS and LMS alone were running approximately 700, or 27 percent of 
Kerala’s 2581 schools.69 
While Protestant missionaries were motivated to promote mass female education as part of their objective 
to propagate the Gospel to all social groups, their education policy showed skillful strategic adaptation to native 
environments that would solidify their footing in local societies. These adaptation strategies were evident in their 
choice of types of schooling; the social strata that they targeted in their female education initiatives; and the 
incentives that they provided to various segments of the female population to embrace education. 
Co-educational schools were often the Protestants’ preferred option as a matter of policy that stressed 
educational equality. Much of the early female schooling effort however went into the creation of separate girls’ 
schools because families refused to send girls to co-educational institutions. In what had been unheard of in India, 
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missions also employed female teachers. This practice gave missionaries competitive advantage over potential other 
education providers insofar as it catered to native concerns for the seclusion of females from males after puberty.70 
Although noted for their abhorrence of the caste system,71 Protestant missionaries also expended 
considerable energy devising strategies for winning over the traditionally elite segments of society. The Church of 
England Zenana Missionary Society (CEZMS) and its CMS affiliates in Kerala founded in 1864 in Trivandrum the 
Fort School for Girls aimed at the exclusive education of caste women under the patronage of Travancore’s royal 
dynasty.72 By 1906, CEZMS ran a network of fifteen girls’ schools. Zenana teachers often faced hostile reaction 
from male heads of household because of overt or subtle proselytizing. In response, the Evangelicals had come to 
downplay Christianity and instead focus on non-religious subjects.73 Over time, Kerala’s elites had come to perceive 
mission schooling as superior to traditional education and as an asset for their daughters’ social status. 
Nevertheless, doctrinal motives of social egalitarianism and a desire to cast their net as widely as possible 
encouraged missionaries to also target low caste women. Characteristic of Kerala society was an elaborate 
hierarchical system of practice, dress, and ritual distinguishing high status from low caste women. Hindus were 
comprised of the elite Brahmins and nairs; and the low caste groups like the ezhavas and slave castes of pulayas, 
pariahs, and kuravas. The low castes faced degrading treatment ranging from the prohibition to carry umbrellas and 
the wearing of shoes or golden accessories, to the requirement to refer to themselves in derogatory terms, to the 
prohibition for shanar women to cover their breasts.74 Slaves “could be let on hire or transferred at the choice of the 
owner, offered as presents to friends or as gifts to temples, and bought, sold, or mortgaged in the same manner as the 
land on which they dwelt or as the cattle and other property of their owners.”75 Education represented an important 
element in this elaborate system of social taboos and exclusion. Caste Hindus refused to be in the same premises as 
“polluting groups” and there had been no question of admitting the latter into the education system. While low caste 
men had some access to segregated vernacular schooling, women remained overwhelmingly illiterate.76 
The German missionary Rev William Tobias Ringeltaube, who set up the first Protestant Church in 
Travancore in 1809, created the earliest precedent for integrated schooling. By 1816, his mission ran seven single-
teacher schools that had 188 pupils. Subsequently, between 1817 and 1839, the first CMS missionary in Travancore, 
the Rev Thomas Norton set up eight further integrated schools. These schools were considered the first modern 
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educational establishments: they admitted boys and girls from amongst lower and upper caste Hindus, Muslims, 
Protestants, Catholics, and other Christians77; rather than rote memorization of ancient texts characteristic of 
prevalent vernacular schooling78, they also taught practical subjects like writing, reading, and arithmetic in English 
or vernacular languages. Early on, Protestant missionaries also pursued collaboration with Syrian Churches aiming 
to set up a school with each Syrian parish, however, disagreements over the prevalence of caste practices in Church 
practice led them to broaden their activities to focus more on the disadvantaged groups.79 Missionaries provided 
higher quality schools with their modern curricula insisted that both low and high caste children be educated 
together and provided incentives to teachers to bring in girls and untouchables into the educational system—cash 
incentives per new pupil were common.80Such actions set an important precedent for modern, integrated, co-
educational schooling that native providers would be forced to emulate in the context of religious competition.  
Protestant missionaries’ initiatives encouraging caste integration in schooling, as indeed their campaigns to 
abolish such practices as the prohibition for shanar women to wear a breast cloth, were bound to attract converts 
from amongst these disadvantaged communities because of instant rewards of status elevation.81 As elsewhere in 
India, conversion proceeded from a handful of socially marginal individuals to voluntary petitions of entire villages 
to convert.82 Conversions in turn not only helped introduce literacy to low caste females, but to ensure literacy 
retention over time and the likelihood of progression to higher levels of schooling. Among Protestant Christians, 
female relapses into illiteracy after puberty were comparatively lower because Church practice and vernacular Bible 
recitation ensured the continued reproduction of reading and writing skills. The Bible was often the only book in a 
Christian village home.83 
The alarmingly high rates of low status conversions in turn fuelled competition among established religious 
groups for adherents.84 Bayly writes with regard to the shifting strategies of the traditionally elite Syrian Churches: 
“Gone were the days when the St. Thomas Christians had … greeted with horror any suggestions that they might be 
identified with their region’s … low-caste Christian converts. Now their priests and eminent landholders … 
compet[ed] energetically to win over more low-caste ‘neophytes’ than their rivals in other Syrian denominations.”85 
Consumer strategic mobility further fuelled this competition: recent converts moved freely between groups as varied 
as Jesuit and Evangelical.86 Similar movements between Hinduism and Christianity occurred.87 Non-establishment 
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Christianity provided a “set of bargaining counters” to low caste “contestants.” “If a group failed to win new rights 
and shares in a locality’s ranking scheme as Hindus, they could convert to Christianity, restage their campaign for 
new honours, and hope to win on the next round,” writes Bayly.88 While the shanars converted en masse to 
Christianity, others like the ezhavas, threatened conversion if caste Hindus would not address their social integration 
demands.89 
Education was central to religious competition strategies. “Opening a grant-in-aid school in the parish 
became … one sure way of ensuring the loyalty of the parish leaders,” writes Mathew.90 Between 1879 and 1895, 
the number of St. Thomas Syrian Church schools grew from 134 to 195, and of Syrian Catholic Church schools, 
from twenty-five in 1890 to forty-nine in 1895.  By the end of the nineteenth century, indigenous schooling eclipsed 
Protestant missionary schools.91 Although government grants to mission schools, which the Evangelicals secured 
after sustained lobbying, played a role in this competition, many new schools, accounting for over 50 percent of total 
enrollment in late nineteenth century Kerala, were unaided.92 
Eventually, competing religious groups, particularly Hindus alarmed by Christian conversions, lobbied the 
government to open more low caste native schools.93 Low caste social movements like the Sree Narayana Dharma 
Paripalana (SNDP) Yogam and Sadhu Jana Paripalana (SJP) Sanghom,94 fuelled by missionaries’ modernization 
initiatives, also became active lobbyists for inclusive schooling. In 1909-10, the Travancore government adopted an 
Education Code, which stipulated that schooling provision would be “without distinction of class or creed”.95 By 
1929-1930, only twelve of Travancore’s 3641 schools banned the untouchables.96 Similar processes were under way 
in other districts that later became part of Kerala. New secular entrepreneurs likewise contributed to competitive 
pressures to expand education. From the 1930s onwards, the Communist party, which became Kerala’s governing 
party in 1957, identified education of disadvantaged groups among its key priorities.97  
Although the key issue in these competitive pressures was low caste schooling and integration in general, 
they were bound to affect educational access for Kerala’s low caste female population. The rapidly narrowing male-
female literacy gaps reflected these processes. Male literacy among ezhavas grew from 13.71 to 61 percent between 
1901 and 1941; in what was a substantially higher increase, female literacy rose from 0.98 to 32.2 percent. The 
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pulayas and other low caste groups recorded similarly higher female, compared to male, literacy growth rates in this 
period.98  
These missionary-fuelled processes of educational expansion account for Kerala’s post-colonial success in 
female education. Many of Kerala’s female and co-educational schools date back to the colonial period. A one-room 
CMS school set up in 1849 for the Mala Arayans hill tribe grew into an English high school in 1939; and a tribal 
school set up in Melukavu in 1852 became a high school in 1968.99 Similar processes of expansion and 
institutionalization of co-educational and female schooling could be traced to other modern schools, which started in 
the nineteenth century as a thatch-and-mud-floor operation. These schools represent a notoriously strong lobby 
group: they help shape state education policy, while fiercely defending their independence.100 
Although our historical discussion helps illuminate missionary impacts on female educational 
advancement, we have yet to establish whether these effects hold throughout India. We also need to explore more 
systematically, whether potential rival explanations of education variations in Indian states still hold when 




To analyze systematically how colonial-era missionary activity may have had long-term impacts on female 
education, we have assembled two district-level datasets covering most of India.  
Employing the first dataset, we seek to uncover the relationship between missionary activity and female 
education as measured by differences between male and female literacy in the colonial period. The second dataset 
will allow us to ascertain the effects of Christianity on female education in post-colonial India. The advantage of 
employing district data is that it allows us to link observations from the two periods. This would not have been 
possible with state-level data because of the India-Pakistan partition and because in the 1950s states were 
reorganized along linguistic lines. The India Administrative Atlas, 1872-2001 enabled us to match colonial with 
post-colonial districts.101 
 17 
Data for the first dataset102 are from the censuses of 1901, 1911, 1921, and 1931. They contain the most 
comprehensive data preceding India’s independence as World War II affected the scope of the 1941 census. Districts 
presently in Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh are excluded, and so are Portuguese- and French-ruled districts.103 We 
do this for the sake of establishing data equivalence over the colonial and post-colonial periods.  
Our key dependent variable is differences between male and female education. Our choice of this particular 
measure is justified on the following grounds. Traditionally, indices of absolute levels of female education were 
employed in development scholarship. Recently, scholars have urged the employment of ratios of male-female 
literacy and of access to primary, secondary, and higher levels of schooling as a complementary or superior measure 
of women’s human capital.104 The UN, OECD, EU, World Bank and other international bodies have likewise moved 
towards incorporating gender equality/ equity measures into their comparative cross-country rankings of human 
development. Since 1995, the UN has been employing a Gender Development Index (GDI), whereby Human 
Development Indices (HDI) adjust for male-female inequalities, rather than simply capturing overall male and 
female educational levels. Other equality indices, such as the Gender Equity Index (GEI), the Relative Status of 
Women Index (RSW) and the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index (GGI) have been also proposed.105  
The introduction of these indices into scholarship and development policy is driven by empirical evidence 
that gender equality, rather than simply levels of female empowerment, significantly affect economic 
competitiveness, growth, and democracy.106 Empirical studies utilizing gender gaps indexes have demonstrated that 
a country’s developmental levels are affected by gender education gaps even when absolute levels of educational 
attainment are eliminated from the analysis, or when overall female education levels are accounted for in the 
analysis.107 
A World Bank study found that even when holding overall female education levels constant, higher 
disparities in male-female education could lead to substantial reduction in GNP in countries that are otherwise 
similar along other dimensions of development.108 Sen and Anand suggest some plausible mechanisms whereby 
gender inequalities could have adverse developmental outcomes.109 A woman’s potential to negotiate household 
expenditures and access to them for herself and her children might be affected by the higher educational stock of her 
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husband; the wife’s household decision-making power is also likely to be affected—she may have limited influence 
over her reproductive rights, the education of her children, and other matters.110 
Our case study likewise demonstrates the utility of the gender gap measure. As we have shown, female 
literacy rates among Kerala’s backward castes grew at a much faster pace than male literacy during colonial-era 
expansion of education. The gender gaps measures capture these “catching up” processes; and so do measures of 
gaps in various stages of schooling that we employ in our post-colonial analysis. These measures may also capture 
the shifting cultural attitudes to male-female equality in access to schooling and generally female status elevation 
that came with missionary involvement. For illustrative purposes, we also replicate our models with the alternative 
measures of overall female literacy levels (appendix, Tables A4 and A5).111  
The measures for the dependent variables for the colonial analysis are the ratio of literate males to literate 
females at the ages of ten to fifteen; fifteen to twenty; and twenty and over. The ratios are calculated by dividing 
numbers of male literates by numbers of female literates for each of the three age groups. The censuses also 
recorded data for age five to ten. Because many districts had missing data for this age group, we exclude them from 
our analysis. The definition of literacy is “the ability to write a letter and to read the answer to it.” It excludes 
individuals without writing skills, for instance many Muslims at the time, who could read the Quran in Arabic, but 
not write.112  
Our measure of the key independent variable in the colonial analysis is the percentage of Christians in the 
total population. Unfortunately, district-level data for adherents of various Christian denominations over time are not 
available from colonial censuses. Our measure is therefore the best proxy of missionary activity for the purposes of 
our analysis. The appendix Table A9 contains India-wide data on growth of Christian adherents by denomination in 
the late colonial period. These data show that rapid growth in Christian adherents was largely due to increases in 
affiliations with Western Christian, particularly Protestant, and not indigenized, Churches like the Syrian Churches. 
The control variables are urbanization; the census category of “European and allied races” (which we refer 
to as “Europeans”); Muslims; state-level per capita educational expenditure;113 and British colonial status. We 
employ urbanization to proxy for modernization, as colonial sources do not contain district-level GDP data.114 The 
variable “Europeans” is included because scholars have postulated links between European settlement and 
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development.115 Islam is included due to the recorded lower literacy levels among Muslim populations.116 It would 
also account for the effects of Muslim Moghul ruler legacies: during the colonial period, missionaries were 
particularly active in southern India, where there had been limited Moghul influence.  
The employment of colonial status will allow us to establish whether direct colonial rule had educational 
effects that were distinct from those in indirectly ruled princely states.117 We assign the value of one to directly ruled 
territories and zero to princely states. Unfortunately, district-level education expenditure data are not available. We 
therefore use per capita state-level expenditure data to control for state education policies, for instance those of 
progressive native rulers.118 We also employ the variables of population percentage shares of “exterior castes” and 
tribal groups’ census categories (we refer to them as “caste” and “tribe”). Only state-level data are available for 
these variables. These variables will enable us to capture the effects of lower literacy in these communities, among 
which there were many Christian converts.119 
In the post-colonial dataset, we use the Vanneman et al. Indian Districts Data, although we also include 
additional data that we gathered.120 The data represent cross-sections and cover the census years 1961, 1971, 1981, 
and 1991. Abhijit Banrjee and Lakshmi Iyer also provided additional time-invariant colonial land tenure data.121  
The post-colonial analysis dependent variables are male-to-female ratios of attendance at primary, 
secondary, and matriculation levels of schooling. We obtained these figures by dividing numbers of male by female 
attendees for the respective education levels. Our key independent variables in the post-colonial analysis are as 
follows. The first variable pertains to modernization. Unfortunately, district-level data for urbanization, which could 
be a proxy for modernization processes, are not available. We therefore employ a substitute measure, namely 
percentage share of individuals in agricultural employment. Additional control variables are population shares of 
scheduled castes and tribes. Another variable that scholars have linked to public goods provision is electoral 
participation.122 The quality of electoral democracy varies across Indian states.123 We therefore include the measure 
of district-level turnout for state legislative elections. In order to account for potential path-dependent effects of 
British colonialism we also include the colonial status variable. We note that in some post-colonial districts, areas 
from British as well as native states were included after states reorganization. We replicate Lakshmi Iyer’s strategy 
in addressing this issue by treating a district as British if a major part of it had been under direct rule.124 As in the 
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colonial period analysis, another variable that we include is state-level per capita educational expenditures.125 To test 
for colonial land tenure effects, which scholars have also linked to variable education outcomes in India (discussed 
below), at one stage of the post-colonial analysis, we also include a variable of the share of landholdings under the 
non-landlord tenure system.126  
Our key variable of interest included as a proxy for colonial-era missionary effects is the district population 
share of Christians in 1931 given the hypothesized importance of colonial-era missionary involvement for female 
education development in India. As our Kerala case study has demonstrated, where missionaries had been active 
early on, they laid the foundations of modern education, which triggered education provision by other groups and 
native governments and long-term institutionalization of female schooling. Alongside this measure, we also include 
the variable of the share of Christian populations in the post-colonial period. We hypothesize that although post-
colonial missionary activity is likely to affect post-colonial literacy colonial-era foundations have particularly strong 
path-dependent effects on post-colonial literacy. Post-colonial missions, after all, operate in contexts of already 
established educational systems and their effects on the provision of education are likely to be different.  
We opted for 1931 data for our key measure of colonial-era missionary influence because the 1931 census 
was the last comprehensive colonial census: World War II limited the scope of the 1941 census operations. It 
therefore represents the best, and the most recent, available measure of Christian missionary influence prior to 
India’s independence in 1947. We present the summary statistics for the two datasets in Table 4.127 
 
Estimation approach 
Our dataset in the colonial period consists of cross-sectional data from districts with observations over time. To 
account for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity, we employ a panel data method to estimate our models. We 
use the population-averaged (PA) panel data estimator, also known as the generalized estimation equation (GEE), 
which allows us to recognize the panel nature of our dataset while eschewing the question of whether or not the 
cross-sectional effects are correlated with the regressors.  
The PA panel data estimator controls for cross-sectional heterogeneity as well as possible effects-regressor 
correlation by averaging the panel-specific effects across all panels. Since our main interest is not in uncovering the 
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magnitudes of district- or subject-specific (SS) effects, this sort of averaging allows us to obtain estimates that 
reflect average effects across all districts as well as estimates that are consistent. The PA estimator takes account of 
within-panel, or district, correlation as well as among-panel, or between-district, heterogeneity when estimating a 
given model.128 
Our data in the post-colonial period consists of three cross-sectional datasets from 1971, 1981, and 1991. 
Since our main explanatory variable is time-invariant, and pre-determined before the outcome variable, we employ a 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) with robust standard errors to estimate our models for each 
period. In particular, we use the Huber–White or heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors, which are 
discussed in several papers including Mackinnon and Halbert (1985).129 
 
Colonial analysis 
For our colonial period analysis, we employ a balanced panel data with 621 observations, corresponding to 207 
districts or cross-sections over four time-periods. In this part of the analysis, we explore the hypothesized links 
between male and female literacy gaps and additional factors that may impinge upon the outcome variable. We 
employ a log-linear model in which the logged values of our several measures of gender discrepancies in literacy are 
regarded as functions of logged values of the combinations of the variables of Christianity; urbanization; Europeans; 
Islam; caste; tribe; education expenditure; and colonial status.130 The model has the form 
itiitiit zxlliter εγβα +++= , TtNi ...1,...1 == , where the left hand side term represents the log of male-female 
literacy discrepancies, x  represents logged values of explanatory variables and z represents time-invariant variables 
that are logged only if continuous , βγα  and ,  represent model parameters, ε  represents a stochastic term, and i 
and t subscript district and time period. 
In the colonial literacy Models 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variables are the ratio of literate males to literate 
females for the ten to fifteen, fifteen to twenty, and twenty and over age groups. We lagged our independent 
variables by a decade such that they correspond to the previous census. Table 1 contains the results.131  
The results that emerge from the three models in Table 1 highlight the importance of Christianity in 
reducing the literacy gap among all age groups, even after accounting for the similar role played by educational 
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expenditure and, to a lesser degree, modernization; urbanization is only significant in Models 1 and 3. While a 1 
percent increase in Christianity contributes to an 8 to 11 percent reduction in this disparity, similar increase in 
educational expenditure contributes to about 6-7 percent reduction, and urbanization to 2-4 percent reduction. That 
the coefficients for Christianity are consistently higher than those for educational expenditures and urbanization 
suggests that in colonial India the variables commonly associated with bridging the gaps in education among men 
and women, such as modernization or greater educational expenditures, are not as powerful or as consistent in 
explaining gender gaps in education progression and retention over time as Christianity. In general, the presence of 
Europeans, the proportion of Muslims, and caste do not have a discernible or consistent effect on the measured 
gender gaps in literacy. On the other hand, tribes seem to have a consistently deleterious effect on gender disparity 
in literacy, aggravating the problem by a statistically significant level of 3-4 percent.  Colonial status has a 
consistently positive association with gender educational inequalities, though its effect is not always significant.   
[Table 1 about here] 
In the appendix Table A1, we replicate these models but without the Kerala districts as an additional 
robustness check given Kerala’s exceptionally high success in female education. We see that the results with regard 
to our key variable of interest, missionary activity, still hold even when we omit Kerala from the analysis. 
 
Post-colonial analysis 
In this second stage of the analysis, we establish whether there are colonial-era missionary effects on differences in 
male and female educational attainment in the post-colonial period. Similar to the colonial period analysis, we 
employ log-linear models, which we estimate using OLS with robust standard errors. We estimate the 
model iiii xleduc εβα ++= , ....1 Ni =  As in the colonial models, α and β are model parameters, ε is random noise, 
and leduc  is the log of the male-female ratios in education attainment measure while x represents the matrix of 
explanatory variables: our main explanatory variable Christianity in 1931, and the control variables colonial status, 
Muslim, farming, castes, tribes, and educational expenditures. In the post-colonial analysis dataset, there are 279 
observations for each cross-section covering three time-periods. A number of colonial districts were divided into 
several districts during the post-colonial period. We therefore have a larger number of observations per time-period 
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in this set of datasets. Although we use data from the 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991 census decades, we have three 
periods because the post-colonial Christianity, caste, tribe, farming, and educational expenditures have been lagged 
by a decade. Our education variables cover data for 1971, 1981, and 1991, and the lagged variables cover the census 
decades 1961, 1971, and 1981. The results are presented in Table 2, Models 4-6.  
The results in the post-colonial models are broadly similar to those found in the colonial period. The effect 
of colonial era Christianity is still strong in each decade even when other important factors that affect the gender gap 
are taken into account across all educational levels. This effect is stronger, contributing to 5-10 percent declines in 
this gap for every 1 percent increase in its level, than contemporaneous levels of Christianity that contribute to about 
2-4 percent declines in the gap for every 1 percent rise. We note that the effect of colonial era Christianity persists 
even though its effect has been declining with passing time. We also observe that its effect is more pronounced as 
we go across higher levels of educational attainment.  Further, the contribution of colonial era Christianity is still 
substantial when we consider that the effects of post-colonial educational expenditures and modernization are 
relatively stronger on reducing the gender educational gap than in the colonial period. The coefficients on both 
farming and educational expenditure are higher than are those on both measures of Christianity. Scheduled tribes 
have a largely positive and statistically significant effect on male-female educational divergence, Islam does not 
have a statistically significant effect across the educational levels and time periods, while caste does not have a 
consistent or statistically meaningful effect on the outcome variables. We do observe, however, that British 
territories are more likely to have lower levels of gender inequalities in schooling over time. The coefficient for the 
colonial status variable is negative and significant in the 1981 and 1991 primary and middle school stage 
regressions, though it is positive and statistically significant for middle school and matriculation stages in 1971; it is 
also negative though not significant at the matriculate stage regressions in 1981 and 1991. As noted above, the 
coefficients for the colonial era Christianity variables are slightly higher at the higher educational level. We infer 
from these results that the positive influence of missionary involvement on gender educational equality becomes 
more pronounced for higher educational levels at which the “wastage” and slippage into illiteracy begins to occur 
among females in Indian society. In the appendix Table A2, we replicate the models without the Kerala districts to 
demonstrate that the results with regard to colonial missionary activity still hold. 
 24 
 [Table 2 about here] 
Next, we seek to ascertain the effects of an additional set of variables on gender gaps in education 
attainment over time. The variables are democracy as measured by district-level voter turnout in state-level 
elections; and colonial land tenure. The inclusion of these measures is justified on the following grounds. Well-
known long-standing theorizing and cross-national empirical scholarship (discussed above) have linked democracy 
to positive educational outcomes. Scholars have also linked land tenure to education in a recent study of 
colonialism’s long-term effects on post-colonial India’s modernization. Because of the complexity of this novel 
argument, we describe it here at some length. Banerjee and Iyer distinguish among three types of land tenure that 
British colonial administrators set up in colonial India—the landlord-, individual cultivator-, and village-based 
systems. The arbitrary power that landlords enjoyed over peasants in landlord areas arguably discouraged public 
goods provision. Because of the facility of capturing productivity gains from non-landlord areas, the British were 
also more inclined to invest in infrastructure and public goods in areas under this type of land tenure as compared to 
those under the landlord system. While not specifically concerned with female education, Banerjee and Iyer link the 
landlord-based arrangements with generally poor education provision in post-colonial Indian states.132 
To instrument for democracy we gathered State Assembly elections data. In contrast to constituencies of 
the Lok Sabha, the national parliament, State Assembly constituencies are usually confined within district 
boundaries (Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976). Since as a rule each district 
has multiple constituencies, we calculated district averages for approximately 4000 constituencies covering all our 
districts. Because State Assembly elections dates vary for each state, we chose an election period of one to three 
years that corresponds to either the end or start of a decade in which most states had elections. To instrument for 
land tenure, we employ Banerjee and Iyer’s measure of district proportion of territories with non-landlord 
systems.133 
The disadvantage of including the electoral and land tenure variables is that we now have fewer 
observations to work with. We employ the 1970-1990s district-level electoral data since most electoral 
constituencies are neatly contained within districts in that period. Because the turnout variable has been lagged by a 
decade, we have two data points in this set of regressions. The education data cover 1981 and 1991, while the 
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electoral variables are for the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Adding the land tenure data also reduces the number of 
observations as there are missing data for a number of our districts in the Banerjee and Iyer dataset. Furthermore, 
Banerjee and Iyer gathered continuous measures of the proportion of non-landlord territories in some districts, while 
for others (including Kerala), for which precise data were not available, the values of either one or zero were 
assigned. We also exclude the latter group of observations from the analysis to ensure consistency with the log-
linear structure of our data. After all the exclusions, we have 65 observations per time group in this set of 
regressions. The regression results are presented in Table 3, Models 7-9. 
In these models, we find that colonial era Christianity still explains a decline in the educational gender gap 
across all educational levels, even when contemporaneous Christianity and educational expenditures that work in 
reducing this gap are taken into account. As in the earlier set of post-colonial period models, educational 
expenditures have stronger impact than both measures of Christianity, with colonial era Christianity having a more 
pronounced effect on this gap than its current counterpart does. Islam, colonial status, caste, and tribe have no 
consistent or statistically significant effect on this gap, while farming has the predicted positive effect on gender 
inequalities in education. The results also suggest that the level of democracy does not have a statistically 
discernible effect in reducing the educational gap, while the share of land under non-landlord systems has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on inequalities in the 1981 regression for matriculates, while being insignificant in 
other models. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
In a further set of regressions performed as an additional robustness check, we include a more limited set of 
variables because of possible multicollinearity that may mask the effect of the newly introduced, and other key, 
variables. Thus, we exclude the post-colonial Christianity and colonial status variables because they may be multi-
collinear with the colonial Christianity and land tenure variables, respectively. Farming is also excluded as is Islam. 
We present the results in the appendix Table A3. The general results with respect to our key variable of interest do 
not change. The land tenure variable does not reduce the educational gap at all levels of schooling while the share of 
tribes likewise does not have a consistent effect on the outcome variable. Educational expenditures have a 
significantly negative effect on educational disparities except for the 1981 matriculates, where the effect is not 
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significant. Colonial Christianity is therefore the only variable that has consistently significant negative effect on 
gender discrepancies in education. These models demonstrate the robustness of our results with respect to our key 
variable of interest. 
 
Discussion 
Colonial-era Christian missionary activity has had direct and indirect effects on female education in the colonial and 
post-colonial periods. In what we consider their direct educational effects, Protestant Missionaries pioneered co-
educational, and introduced new forms of female, schooling for all religious groups; female Christian converts also 
experienced additional educational effects in terms of literacy retention at a later age due to Church practice. Over 
time, in what could be regarded as indirect effects, missionary efforts led to the broadening of educational provision 
by a variety of actors—religious groups, native governments, social movements, and political entrepreneurs, leading 
to its greater social acceptability. These actors’ combined lobbying efforts also forced the institutionalization of 
integrated education for all social groups as government policy, rather than that limited to a narrow range of 
education providers. Both the social acceptability of female schooling and its institutionalization led to the durability 
of gender equality in educational access in the post-colonial period.  
 Our empirical study, while drawing on the religious competition framework, also has implications for 
theory development as it helps specify the mechanisms of strategic adaptation of religious groups to the particular 
context of a colonial female education marketplace. Religious competition drove educational expansion in Kerala. 
Protestant entrants into Kerala’s religious marketplace faced a handful of established religious monopolies, which, 
together with native governments presided over, and helped perpetuate in their practice, elaborate systems of gender 
and caste hierarchies. As religious competition theory would predict, such established monopolies have little 
incentive to change the status quo absent serious challengers: the social welfare of religious adherents usually falls 
victim to such monopolistic situations.134  
New entrants to the marketplace are much more sensitive to consumer preferences as they have to work 
extra hard to capture a share of an already established market. Herein is the fallacy of traditional accounts of 
missionary involvement in colonies, namely the notion that missionaries imposed alien mores on passive and pliant 
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local populations.135 Admittedly, doctrinal matters drove the general outlines of Evangelical policy in India: the 
social hierarchies and accompanying practices perceived as degrading towards women and other disadvantaged 
groups were at odds with the missionaries’ egalitarian notions of social welfare. Consumer demand however drove 
missionary strategies much as their doctrinal zeal did. These two factors explain their choice of the female education 
strategy, rather than that solely catering to native male sensibilities with regard to female education and focusing on 
the male educational market. Having opted for the former strategy, and faced with the option of concentrating on 
elite female education or casting their net to include disadvantaged groups, missionaries chose to work in both 
markets, and tailor their approaches to the respective target audiences. Protestant missionaries were not adverse to 
courting native elite women, secularizing and otherwise adapting their curricula and methods of instruction to this 
social stratum. Compared to the low castes, this group was easier to work with insofar as it had already 
comparatively higher education levels prior to missionary involvement, but was a more difficult target insofar as it 
had been less amenable to conversion. Their simultaneous strategies to win converts from amongst much wider 
social networks representing disadvantaged groups however helped undermine the very system which sanctioned 
education for elite Kerala women only. For centuries denied the status trappings of higher caste groups, those 
relegated to untouchability were not passive recipients of Evangelical doctrine. Instead, they were keen to adopt the 
substantive, as well as symbolic elements of higher status as soon as those options became available. For shanar 
females, the cloth covering their upper bodies became as much a symbol of status elevation as the opportunity for 
education.136 Whether they became Christian converts or simply recipients of missionary education, these groups 
signaled to religious monopolies that they need not take their allegiance for granted. The latter, not hitherto 
associated with female educational provision, became active contenders for social allegiances in a more vibrant 
religious marketplace by emulating the policies of new entrants. The social awareness among low caste groups that 
these various educational initiatives spurred led to the development of native movements from amongst both elite 
and low status groups. While not specifically concerned with female education, these movements ensured that 
integrated schooling for all groups in society would become enshrined in government policy, thereby accelerating 
the “catching up” process of female educational attainment.  
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Although missionaries spurred competition in education provision for all native groups, conversions had 
additional effects on active practitioners of Christianity. Regular Bible reading ensured that low status female 
converts would have comparatively higher literacy retention rates than female adherents of other faiths in the same 
social group who tended to lose literacy skills after marriage.137 
 Scholars have attributed Kerala’s success in female education to its Christianization prior to colonial-era 
Protestant involvement; progressive native governments; tradition of matriliny (we note, limited to the higher 
castes); communist government; or a vicious caste system, which was ostensibly more conducive to social 
mobilization for educational change.138 Our statistical analysis has demonstrated that missionary involvement has 
had consistently strong effects on reducing gender educational disparities throughout India even when we exclude 
Kerala districts from our regressions. While we do not dismiss the importance of Kerala-specific factors contributing 
to its educational success, both our case study and statistical analysis show that missionary involvement may be a 
more powerful explanatory factor than those focusing on the peculiarities of that particular state. 
We also infer from our results that while post-colonial missionary involvement is important for female 
education colonial-era missionary activity appears to be a stronger predictor of gender education outcomes. The 
Kerala case study suggests that we could attribute this result to the colonial-era institutionalization of mass 
schooling, which post-colonial governments have had to reckon with in the context of democratic politics and in 
ways that would be different from government policy where no such precedent had been established early on.   
While contributing to religious competition theory, our study is also relevant for the debates on the legacies 
of colonialism. Contrary to claims of influential cross-national studies about the long-term positive effects of British 
education policy, such as those of Lipset et al. and Barro, we find no consistent evidence for that claim with respect 
to gender education parity, particularly at higher levels of schooling.139 Instead, our findings dovetail with recent 
within-nation scholarship that question the assumption of the beneficial effects of British rule on human capital 
outcomes in British India.140 Although we do not replicate the Banerjee and Iyer study, we are also able to test 
whether colonial land tenure effects on human capital hold when applied to our variables of interest. We find that 
they are largely insignificant when missionary influences are taken into account, while missionary effects are robust 
to the inclusion of the land tenure variable at all educational levels.141 We conjecture that previous research may 
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have found large apparent effects of British colonialism on education as a result of failing to consider the effects of 
missionary activities.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Tables 
Table 1: Colonial Period 
    
  Model 1: 10-15 age Model 2: 15-20 age Model 3: 20 and over age 
Variables GEE AR(1) Estimates GEE AR(1) Estimates GEE AR(1) Estimates 
Colonial Status  0.126 0.072 0.072 
 0.079 0.072 0.065 
Urbanization -0.027 -0.019 -0.035 
 0.015* 0.013 0.012** 
Muslim  -0.039 -0.04 -0.045 
 0.031 0.028 0.026 
Christian  -0.112 -0.101 -0.079 
 0.012** 0.011** 0.010** 
Europeans 0.005 0.007 0.001 
 0.011 0.011 0.01 
Caste -0.013 -0.024 0.018 
 0.013 0.012** 0.011 
Tribe 0.031 0.04 0.03 
 0.009** 0.008** 0.007** 
Educational 
Expenditure 
-0.057 -0.061 -0.074 
 0.013** 0.012** 0.011** 
Constant 1.949 2.145 2.74 
 0.125** 0.115** 0.105** 
N 621 621 621 
Groups 207 207 207 
Years 1901, 1911, 1921, 
1930 
1901, 1911, 1921, 
1930 






Table 2: Post-Colonial Period 
          
  Model 4: Primary schooling Model 5: Middle schooling Model 6: Matriculates 
Variables  Cross-Sectional Estimates with Robust Standard Errors 
Cross-Sectional Estimates with Robust 
Standard Errors 
Cross-Sectional Estimates with Robust 
Standard Errors 
Year 1971 1981 1991 1971 1981 1991 1971 1981 1991 
Colonial Status  0.011 -0.133 -0.145 0.090 -0.068 -0.124 0.121 -0.032 -0.043 
 0.033 0.029** 0.029** 0.040** 0.035* 0.033** 0.051** 0.043 0.037 
 Muslim  -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 0.002 -0.002 
 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.009 
 Christian -0.035 -0.018 -0.015 -0.038 -0.035 -0.028 -0.039 -0.027 -0.033 
 0.005** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009** 
Farming  0.146 0.111 0.080 0.169 0.126 0.099 0.203 0.164 0.120 
 0.041** 0.033** 0.025** 0.046** 0.038** 0.030** 0.058** 0.053** 0.036** 
Christian 1931  -0.072 -0.071 -0.052 -0.095 -0.080 -0.054 -0.097 -0.088 -0.066 
 0.011** 0.009** 0.008** 0.014** 0.011** 0.010** 0.020** 0.015** 0.011** 
Educational Expenditure -0.098 -0.502 -0.508 -0.123 -0.492 -0.503 -0.078 -0.511 -0.432 
 0.037** 0.045** 0.048** 0.044** 0.053** 0.053** 0.058 0.069** 0.064** 
Caste  0.027 -0.012 -0.014 0.081 -0.007 -0.008 0.068 -0.012 -0.008 
 0.022 0.011 0.007* 0.033** 0.017 0.011 0.043 0.013 0.012 
Tribe  0.008 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.010 0.010 0.004 
 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 
Constant 0.486 1.565 2.135 0.516 1.621 2.191 0.632 1.682 1.973 
 0.156** 0.160** 0.202 0.178** 0.190** 0.228** 0.224** 0.246** 0.272** 
N 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
R-squared 0.634 0.705 0.652 0.633 0.696 0.647 0.514 0.628 0.627 





Table 3: Post-Colonial Period, with Electoral Turnout and Land Tenure Variables 
       
  Model 7: Primary Schooling Model 8: Middle Schooling Model 9: Matriculates 
Variables  Cross-Sectional Estimates with Robust Standard Errors 
Cross-Sectional Estimates with 
Robust Standard Errors 
Cross-Sectional Estimates 
with Robust Standard Errors 
Year 1981 1991 1981 1991 1981 1991 
Colonial Status  -0.181 -0.103 -0.128 -0.067 -0.004 -0.059 
 0.072** 0.047** 0.091 0.058 0.182 0.072 
 Muslim  0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 
 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Christian -0.016 -0.013 -0.033 -0.019 -0.044 -0.030 
 0.009* 0.006** 0.011** 0.007** 0.011** 0.008** 
Farming  0.516 0.449 0.700 0.542 0.957 0.631 
 0.149** 0.110** 0.151** 0.113** 0.150** 0.125** 
Christian 1931  -0.064 -0.041 -0.073 -0.052 -0.062 -0.054 
 0.029** 0.016** 0.026** 0.016** 0.030** 0.018** 
Educational Expenditure -0.356 -0.392 -0.359 -0.488 -0.250 -0.462 
 0.098** 0.126** 0.109** 0.128** 0.111** 0.148** 
Caste  0.128 0.045 0.124 0.086 0.063 0.102 
 0.080 0.110 0.072* 0.102 0.077 0.089 
Tribe  0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 
 0.003 0.002** 0.003 0.002** 0.004* 0.003 
Electoral Turnout -0.024 -0.282 -0.208 -0.158 -0.172 -0.115 
 0.272 0.215 0.242 0.188 0.265 0.171 
Land Tenure  -0.016 -0.021 0.022 -0.016 0.054 0.005 
 0.041 0.033 0.026 0.029 0.028* 0.022 
Constant -0.222 1.514 0.169 1.068 -0.793 0.612 
 1.188 0.719 1.154 0.661 1.133 0.649 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R-squared 0.815 0.795 0.869 0.822 0.834 0.810 





Table 4: Summary Statistics 
            
Colonial Period  
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Colonial Status Binary 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Christian Percent 1.3 3.5 0.0 31.5 
Muslim Percent 11.3 11.9 0.1 97.7 
Urbanization Percent 11.2 12.3 0.0 100.0 
Europeans Percent 0.1 0.3 0.0 3.2 
Caste Percent 0.1 0.1 0.1 35.0 
Tribe Percent 0.1 0.1 0.0 44.9 
Per Capita Educational Expenditure Rupees 0.6 0.6 0.0 2.0 
Male-Female Literacy Ratio 10-15 Number 10.1 9.4 1.3 165.0 
Male-Female Literacy Ratio 15-20 Number 10.9 6.9 1.3 49.9 
Male-Female Literacy Ratio 20-Over Number 17.2 9.2 2.5 64.7 
            
Post-Colonial Period 
Variable Units Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Post-Colonial Christian Percent 2.8 8.8 0.0 86.6 
Muslim Percent 10.5 13.8 0.0 98.6 
Farming Percent 24.4 8.4 0.0 56.2 
Per Capita Educational Expenditure Rupees 33.0 41.4 0.5 275.6 
Electoral Turnout Percent 56.8 14.7 3.6 91.5 
Caste Percent 14.1 7.7 0.0 39.1 
Tribe Percent 10.5 18.2 0.0 97.0 
Male-Female Primary School Ratio Number 3.3 2.3 1.1 24.8 
Male-Female Middle School Ratio Number 3.4 1.8 1.1 13.6 
Male-Female Matriculates Ratio Number 5.7 5.0 1.0 41.7 
Non-Landlord Tenure Percent 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 
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